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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant#

)

vs.

) Case No. 981567-CA

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,

) Civil No. 910750473
) Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RICKY D. KRAMBULE

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE:

Are there existing genuine disputes over material

facts justifying denial of Barbara R. Krambule1s Motion for
Summary Judgment that Ricky D. Krambule be adjudged the "legal
father" of Mathew Krambule.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On review of a summary judgment the
-1-

party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to
have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly
arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to him.
Winegar vs. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the
trial court's legal conclusion. Barber vs. Farmer's Insurance
Exchange. 715 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998.
ISSUE;

Was Rick D. Krambule entitled to be notified by

Barbara R. Krambule after the parties separation she was
continuing with artificial insemination procedures to conceive a
child for which she intended to hold him as the "legal father"?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary Judgment is appropriate only
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ.

P.56; Western Fam. Credit Bank vs. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah
App. 1993), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994).
In addition, when granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, a
trial judge must consider each element of the claim under the
appropriate standard of proof.

Andalex Resources, Inc. vs.

Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994).

Accordingly, in

evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, the court
must take into consideration the eventual standard of proof for
each element at trial on the merits.
-2-

Robinson vs. Intermountain

Health Care. 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987).
The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 27, 19 98.
ISSUE:

Does there exist a genuine dispute over material

facts precluding Barbara Krambule from asserting Ricky Krambule
is the father of Mathew Krambule pursuant to Doctrines of
Estoppel and Res Judicata.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The nonmoving party, in order to defeat
summary judgment, need only make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.

Celltex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S., 317, 324 (1986).

The trial court granted Barbara Krambule•s Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 27, 19 98.
ISSUE:

Did Barbara Krambule waive contractual rights under

the Agreement to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through
Artificial Insemination by failing to assert her rights until
four (4) years had passed?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The records and facts must be reviewed
in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997).
The trial court must construe not only facts but all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Lopez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 602

(Utah 1997).
-3-

Summary Judgment is only appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of material facts and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) .

The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Appellant, Ricky D. Krambule, does not believe there
are any existing constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of
this appeal except interpretation of Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is made from an. order of the Second Judicial
District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Darwin C. Hansen, granting Barbara Krambule's Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce.

Barbara Krambule filed a Petition seeking a

court order declaring her minor child, Mathew Krambule, to be the
natural child of Ricky Krambule.

Further, she sought an order

requiring Ricky Krambule to assume and pay all medical bills of
her pregnancy, for past due child support, day care for the
child, and for a court order setting the amount for ongoing child
support.
-4-

The trial court granted Barbara Krambule's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ruling Rick Krambule to be the legal
father of Mathew Krambule, and therefore had the legal duties of
a biological father.

The trial court signed an order granting

Barbara Krambule's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 27, 1998.
The trial court reserved for further hearing the issues of child
support, past due child support, day care, medical expenses, and
attorney fees.

The court entered an order on July 9, 1998

entitled Modified Decree of Divorce wherein the Court ruled on
the issues of ongoing child support, past due child support,
medical expenses, day care for the minor child, Mathew Krambule,
together with an award of attorney fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, Ricky D. Krambule, signed a Complaint for
divorce on July 29, 1991 and the same was filed in August, 1991.
(Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce)

At the time Petitioner

filed, one child had been born of issue of the marriage, to-wit:
Stephanie Krambule, date of birth January 29, 1985. (Petitioner's
Complaint)

Stephanie was conceived by means of artificial

insemination.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, page 4-5)

Rick and Barbara Krambule separated on May 3, 1998 when Rick
Krambule moved out of the parties' home.
Deposition at page 11)

(Barbara Krambule's

After the parties' separated on May 3,

1991, Barbara Krambule continued to undergo artificial insemina-

-5-

tion procedures at the University of Utah in May, 1991 and June,
1991.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 17-18). Barbara

Krambule conceived on June 23, 1991 by means of artificial
insemination with a sperm donor.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition,

pg. 18). Rick Krambule is unable to have children as he is
sterile.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 5 ) .

Krambule was born on March 24, 1992.

Mathew

(Barbara Krambule's

Deposition, pg. 30).
Barbara Krambule did not advise Rick Krambule that she was
continuing with the artificial insemination procedures after the
parties' separation on May 3, 1991.
Deposition, pg. 18-19) .

(Barbara Krambule's

Barbara Krambule advised Rick Krambule

she had conceived and was pregnant with Mathew in September,
maybe August, 1991.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 21).

After Rick Krambule moved out on May 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule
wrote out all the checks to pay the University medical bills.
(Deposition of Barbara Krambule, pg. 47).
Barbara Krambule retained an attorney and filed an Answer
and Counterclaim in September, 1991.

The Counterclaim did not

make any reference to Barbara Krambule expecting a child.
(Answer and Counterclaim).
On December 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule's attorney wrote that
Barbara Krambule was expecting a child; that she was somewhere
between four and six months pregnant.
Barbara Krambule's Deposition).

(Deposition Exhibit 2,

The letter indicated Barbara

Krambule had debated at great lengths whether she should or
-6-

should not pursue having the Court order Rick Krambule to be the
father and pursue child support for her expected child. (Barbara
Krambule's Deposition Exhibit 2 ) . The letter indicated Barbara
Krambule was not going to sign the Stipulation and Property
Settlement as it did not provide for acknowledgment and support
of her expected child.

(Exhibit 2, Barbara Krambule's

Deposition).
However, on January 16, 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then
attorney executed the Stipulation which did not provide for the
expected child and returned the same to Rick Krambule's attorney.
On February 10, 1992, Rick Krambule appeared before District
Court Judge, Michael D. Allphin, to obtain a Decree of Divorce.
Rick Krambule was sworn and testified and indicated since the
parties' separation, Barbara Krambule had become pregnant by
means of artificial insemination and that he was not the father
of that child and she acknowledged that to be true.

(Minute

Entry to Decree of Divorce and Affidavit of Linda Stewart). On
April 3, 1992, the Decree of Divorce was granted and entered by
the Clerk of the Court.

(Decree of Divorce).

Mathew Krambule

was born on March 24, 1992; approximately ten (10) days prior to
the divorce becoming final. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg.
30) .
Consistent with the parties' Decree of Divorce, Rick
Krambule paid Barbara Krambule $274.00 per month alimony for a
period not to exceed four (4) years from June 1, 1991.

(Decree

of Divorce). Rick Krambule also paid for books and tuition for
-7-

Barbara Krambule to attend Weber State University; likewise for a
period not to exceed four (4) years from June 1, 1991.
of Divorce).

(Decree

Barbara Krambule acknowledged Rick Krambule paid

the alimony and for her college tuition and books.

(Barbara

Krambule's Deposition, pg. 28). Rick Krambule has never exercised
visitation with Mathew; although he sees Stephanie on a regular
basis.

(Deposition of Barbara Krambule, pg. 29). Stephanie lived

with Rick Krambule for the school year 1997-1998.

(Rick

Krambule's Petition for Modification of Decree).
On July 15, 1996, Barbara Krambule filed a Petition in the
above-entitled case seeking to adjudicate the parentage of Mathew
Krambule requesting the Court determine Rick Krambule to be the
natural father and obliged to pay child support, day care,
medical expenses.

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 29).

At the request of the Court, both parties filed Motions for
Summary Judgment.

On January 21, 1998, both Motions for Summary

Judgment were argued before District Court Judge, Darwin C.
Hansen.

Judge Hansen indicated he was going to treat both

motions as Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.

(1/21/98 TR. at

61). The trial court found while there are issues of fact in the
pleadings of the parties, the Court does not find that those
issues are material with reference to the ruling on the legal
obligation of whether Krambule is the legal father.

(1/21/98 TR.

at 61).
The trial court found it is clear that Rick Krambule is not
the biological father of Mathew Krambule.
-8-

(1/21/98 TR. at 61).

The trial court indicated the Court must look at the facts
surrounding how this conception occurred and make a judgment
whether or not a legal obligation exists on the part of both
parties in reference to any child born as a result of artificial
insemination medical treatment.

(1/21/98 TR. at 61-62). The

Court found the parties entered into a contract on or about July
18, 1990 in an effort to have a child.

(1/21/98 TR. at 62). The

contract gave rise to a legal obligation on the part of both
parties to be legally responsible for any child that is born as a
result of that treatment.

(1/21/98 TR. at 62) .

The trial court ruled as a matter of law that for the
contract to become null and void and not applicable to the
parties, an event must occur.

(1/21/98 TR. at 62). A divorce

which is a legal direct declaration by the Court that a husband
and wife are no longer husband and wife, would automatically
terminate the contract.

(1/21/98 TR. at 62-63). In this

particular case, the child was conceived during the marriage, and
indeed, born before the Decree of Divorce was signed.

(1/21/98

TR. at 63). For those reasons, the trial court found that Rick
Krambule was the legal father of Mathew.

(1/21/98 TR. at 63).

The Court ruled public policy is clear before we take away the
rights of a child there has to be a very compelling reason.
(1/21/98 TR. at 64). In the context of this case, the only way
the Court would be persuaded that Rick Krambule in this case does
not have a legal obligation to Mathew is if in fact a divorce had
occurred prior to conception.

(1/21/98 TR. at 65).
-9-

The deposition of Barbara Krambule was ordered published and
made part of the Court file by the trial court.

(1/21/98 TR. at

68-69).
On April 30, 1998, trial was held before District Court
Judge, Darwin C. Hansen, on the issues of child support, day
care, arrearages for child support and day care, and medical
expenses, together with attorney fees.

Barbara Krambule

acknowledged she did not ask Rick Krambule to pay for any medical
expenses for Mathew after April, 1991.

(4/30/98 TR. at 77).

Barbara Krambule testified she changed her position in regard to
making Mathew an issue at the time of the initial divorce in 1991
as she just wanted to sign the divorce papers and try and get her
life back together.

(4/30/98 TR. at 96-97).

She thought the

best thing for all of us for now is just to get divorced and work
on it in the future.

(4/30/98 TR. at 97). When she got stronger

and healthier she could go back and readdress this issue.
(4/30/98 TR. at 97). Barbara Krambule acknowledged she did not
tell Rick Krambule she was going to readdress the issue of Mathew
when she got stronger.

(4/30/98 TR. at 97) .

Rick Krambule testified that in October, 1991, Barbara
Krambule told him all she wanted from him in terms of Mathew was
the use of the Krambule name, she expected no child support and
expected no relationship.

(4/30/98 TR. at 152-153) .

Karen

Krambule Hiller, Rick Krambule's sister, testified in a telephone
conversation in September, 1991, Barbara Krambule stated she did
not want Rick Krambule to have anything to do with the child at
-10-

all and the only thing she wanted was the child to have the same
last name as she had.

(4/30/98 TR. at 197-199) .

In Findings of Fact 9a. to the Modified Decree of Divorce,
the Court made a Finding during late October, 1991 after
Respondent's pregnancy with Mathew became known, Respondent told
Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Mathew and
nothing more from him.

In Findings of Fact 9b., the Court found

Barbara Krambule essentially made the same statement to
Petitioner's sister.

In Findings of Fact 9e., the Court made a

finding that Barbara Krambule filed her Petition to Modify Decree
of Divorce and for paternity as to Mathew on July 15, 1996, four
years and three months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
In Finding of Fact 10. the Court found in return for
Respondent's failure to act or to make claim against Petitioner
for legal benefits concerning Mathew, Rick Krambule agreed to pay
Respondent alimony, provide for Barbara Krambule's education at
Weber State University in Ogden, Utah and proceeded to his life
without consideration as to any financial obligation for Mathew,
for purposes of establishing Rick Krambule's estoppel argument.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There exists genuine disputes of material facts justifying
denial of Barbara Krambule's Motion for Summary Judgment that
Rick Krambule be adjudicated the legal father of Mathew Krambule.
-11-

The trial court found that Rick Krambule was not the biological
father of Mathew Krambule.

Thus no legal presumption exists that

Rick Krambule is the father of Mathew Krambule born to his wife,
Barbara, during their marriage.

Rick Krambule has not visited

nor maintained any relationship whatsoever with Mathew Krambule
in reliance on Barbara Krambule's statement to him that she
wanted nothing from him but the Krambule name.
The only manner in which Rick Krambule can be found to be
the legal father of Mathew Krambule is pursuant to the contract
of July 18, 1990 entitled Consent to Perform Procedures to
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor/Sperm.
The trial court ruled this contract could only be reputed by
divorce which occurred prior to the conception of Mathew on June
23, 1992.
The contract should be construed to give effect to the
intent of the parties.

The intent of the parties is gleaned from

the totality of the circumstances.

Paragraph 8 of the contract

indicates that participation in the artificial insemination
procedure(s) is voluntary.

The issue is not whether the contract

was voluntarily signed initially but whether Rick Krambule's
participation in the artificial procedure(s) was voluntary.
Participation speaks in terms of future tense.

It is a factual

question for a court of law to determine if Rick Krambule
voluntarily consented to participation

of artificial

insemination procedure(s) after initially signing.

A reasonable

interpretation of the agreement is that continued participation
-12-

in the artificial insemination procedures was contingent upon
voluntary participation of both parties.
Voluntary is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th
Edition, as:
Done by design or intention, purpose,
intended. Produced in or by an act
of choice. Resulting from choosing. The
word, especially in statutes, often implies
knowledge of essential facts.
Rick Krambule was entitled to be notified that Barbara
Krambule was continuing with the artificial insemination
procedures after the parties separated on May 3, 1991.

Barbara

Krambule testified in her deposition she did not tell Rick
Krambule she was continuing with participation in the artificial
insemination program.
19).

(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 18-

Barbara Krambule owed Rick Krambule a duty of good faith

and fair dealing and should have advised him of her continued
participation in the artificial insemination program.

When one

party to a contract retains power and sole discretion, it must
exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith.

If Rick

Krambule had knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued
participation in the program, he could have taken appropriate
action to protect his legal rights.
Barbara Krambule should be equitably estopped from alleging
Rick Krambule is the father of Mathew having waited four (4)
years and three (3) months after the parties' Decree of Divorce
before she made a claim to determine that he is the natural
father of Mathew.

Rick Krambule relied on Barbara Krambule's
-13-

representations that she would not pursue making Mathew Krambule
an issue.

In 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed

a Stipulation which did not acknowledge Rick Krambule was the
father of Mathew.

Findings and a Decree of Divorce was signed

approved as to form by Barbara Krambule's attorney.

In a letter

dated December 3, 1991, Barbara Krambule stated she was going to
make the issue of parentage of Mathew an issue.

Barbara Krambule

changed her mind about making an issue of parentage of Mathew at
the time of the divorce until she felt stronger and healthier.
She proceeded to make Mathew an issue some four (4) years and
three (3) months later.
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata should prohibit
Barbara Krambule's making a claim to determine the parentage of
Mathew Krambule as that issue could have and should have been
litigated in the original Decree of Divorce granted on April 4,
1992 .
Barbara Krambule should also be deemed to have waived any
contractual rights under the artificial insemination contract as
she intentionally acted in a matter inconsistent with those
contractual rights causing prejudice to Rick Krambule.

-14-

ARGUMENT

THERE EXISTS GENUINE DISPUTES OVER
MATERIAL FACTS JUSTIFYING DENIAL
OF BARBARA KRAMBULE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT RICK KRAMBULE
BE ADJUDICATED THE LEGAL FATHER OF
MATHEW KRAMBULE

Mathew Krambule was born March 24, 1992 b e f o r e t h e
d i v o r c e was f i n a l .

Utah Code Annotated,

§30-1-17.2(2)

parties
states

as

follows,
children born to the parties after the
date of the marriage shall be deemed the
legitimate children of both parties for
all purposes.
This statute is often cited for the presumption that
children born during the course of a marriage are presumed to be
the children of the husband and wife.
"Lord Mansfield Rule".
(Utah 1990).

It is commonly called

State in Interest of J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710

However, Lord Mansfield's rule has been

substantially eroded by the enactment of §78-25-18, U.C.A. which
expressly mandates the court's utilize blood tests to assist in
making a determination of paternity.

In this case, the parties

stipulated that Rick D. Krambule was not the biological father of
Mathew Krambule.

The trial court found in Findings of Fact No. 3

on Motion for Summary Judgment that Rick D. Krambule is not the
-15-

biological father of the minor child, Mathew Krambule. Therefore,
no legal presumption exists that Rick Krambule is the father of
Mathew Krambule having been determined by the Court not to be his
biological father.
The trial court found that on July 18, 1990, the parties
entered into a contract entitled Consent to Perform Procedures to
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm.
(Findings of Fact 5 on Motion for Summary Judgment)

The trial

court found that this contract obligated Rick Krambule and
Barbara Krambule to assume the legal responsiblity for the child,
Mathew Krambule.

(Findings of Fact 5 ) . Therefore, the court

found Rick Krambule to be the legal father of Mathew Krambule
pursuant to the parties' artificial insemination contract.
(Findings of Fact 9 ) .

In essence, this case involves contract

interpretation as well as typical domestic relations issues.
In Findings of Fact No. 7. on Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court found that in order for the artificial
insemination contract to be null and void an event must occur
which would terminate the contract.

The trial court did not rule

on all of the events that could terminate such a contract,
however in this case, the trial court ruled that a divorce could
have terminated the contract.
In Conclusions of Law No. 2 on Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court ruled the artificial insemination contract was
not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this case
could only be reputed by divorce which occurred prior to the
-16-

conception of the child.

The child was conceived on June 23,

1992 which was prior to the filing of the Complaint for divorce
in this case.

The court ruled in Conclusions of Law No. 4 on

Motion for Summary Judgment the artificial insemination contract
was binding on the parties and imposed on both parties the legal
responsiblity of natural parents to the child Mathew Krambule.
The issue regarding the parties intent of the artificial
insemination contract and its interpretation, becomes an
important focal point in this case.

Contracts should be

construed to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Debry v.

Occidental/Nebraska. Fed. Sav.. 754 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1988).

It

is the duty of every court to ascertain and give effect to the
intentions of the parties.

Such intent is gleaned from the

totality of the circumstances.

See Allen v. Prudential Property

and Cas. Ins.. 839 P.2d 798, 810 (Utah 1992).
In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment on
the basis of the contract standing alone.

The trial court did

not hear any evidence as to the intent of the parties nor whether
the contract is clear on its face.

This is not an appropriate

case to grant summary judgment as there are genuine disputes over
material facts.

When interpretation of a contract must be

determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question
of fact, and if this extrinsic evidence is disputed, then a
material fact is also disputed and summary judgment cannot be
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granted.

Record v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994).

If the contract is in writing and the language is not
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from
the words of the agreement.

Atlas Corp. V. Clovis Nat'1 Bank,

838 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

A Court may only consider

extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract
language is ambiguous or uncertain.
P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665

A contractual provision is

ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies.

Winegar v. Froerer Corp.,

813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 199)
Paragraph eight (8) of the artificial insemination contract
states "our participation in the artificial insemination
procedure(s) is voluntary".

A reasonable interpretation of

paragraph (8) is that Rick Krambule could withdraw his consent at
any time. Rick Krambule must act voluntarily at the time of
signing and also in the future.
Paragraph (8) can logically be interpreted to mean all
future or continued participation must be voluntary.

For Rick

Krambule's consent to be voluntary he should have knowledge of
Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to achieve pregnancy by
artificial insemination. Voluntary is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as an act of choice, resulting from choosing and often
implies knowledge of essential facts.
-18-

II

RICK KRAMBULE WAS ENTITLED
TO BE NOTIFIED THAT BARBARA
KRAMBULE CONTINUED WITH
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
PROCEDURES TO CONCEIVE A
CHILD AFTER THE PARTIES'
SEPARATION INTENDING TO HOLD
HIM AS THE LEGAL FATHER
The parties separated on May 3, 1991.

Thereafter, Barbara

Krambule continued to undergo artificial insemination procedures.
Barbara Krambule did not advise Rick Krambule she was continuing
to try to conceive a child by means of artificial insemination.
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 19). Barbara Krambule
conceived on June 23, 1992 by means of artificial insemination.
She gave birth to Mathew Krambule on March 24, 1992.
Barbara Krambule relies on the Consent to Perform Procedures
to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination agreement
arguing Rick Krambule should be determined to be the legal father
of Mathew Krambule.

This agreement refers to the parties as

"husband and wife".

Paragraph 2 states "we hereby affirm our

desire to achieve pregnancy and request ..." Page 5 of the
agreement is signed as husband and wife.

A reasonable

interpretation of the contract would be the intent of the parties
at the time of execution of the contract was that of a viable
couple desiring to achieve a pregnancy by artificial insemination
-19-

because of sterility.
Paragraph 8 of the contract states that the parties'
participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is
voluntary.

Barbara Krambule owed Rick Krambule a duty of good

faith and fair dealing and should have advised him of her
continued participation in the artificial insemination program.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if
not all contractual relationships.

St. Benedict's Dev. vs. St.

Benedict's Hosp. . 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) .
When one party to a contract retains power or sole
discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that
discretion reasonably and in good faith.

Olympus Hills Center,

LTD. v. Smith's Food. 889 P.2d 445, 450-451, (Utah App. 1994)
cert, denied 889 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Cook v. Zions First Nat'1
Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1996).
Compliance with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
depends upon the agreed common purpose and justified expectations
of the parties.

Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d

285, 291 (Utah App. 1994).

Good faith and fair dealing are fact

sensitive concepts and whether there is a breach of good faith
and fair dealing is a factual issue generally inappropriate for
decision as a matter of law.

Cook v. Zion's First Nat'1 Bank,

919 P.2d 56, 60-61 (Utah App. 1996); Republic Group, Inc. vs.
Won-Door Corp. . 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994) .
Without knowledge of Barbara Krambule's continued efforts to
become pregnant by means of artificial insemination, Rick
-20-

Krambule was unable to protect his legal rights in this matter.
Barbara Krambule acting alone held the power and the ability to
become pregnant without the consent and assistance of Rick
Krambule.

Barbara Krambule has not acted in good faith and fair

dealing by withholding knowledge of her continued attempts to
become pregnant.

Without specific knowledge of Barbara

Krambule's continued efforts to become pregnant, Rick Krambule
has not voluntarily participated in the artificial insemination
procedure (s) .
In the case of In Re: Marriage of Witback-Wildhagen, 667
N.E. 2d 122 (111. App.4 Dist. 1996).

The appellate court of

Illinois interpreted the Illinois artificial insemination statute
and also addressed the issue of obtaining the actual consent of
the husband.

Illinois has a statute holding if under the

supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of the
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by
a man not her husband, the husband shall be treated in law as if
he were the natural father of the child thereby conceived.
Because the Illinois statute requires the physician to
certify the date of insemination, the Court concluded the
husband's written consent is required each time his wife is to
undergo the procedure.

Such a requirement is not burdensome and

leaves no room for confusion on the part of the married couple or
the physician regarding whether a consent previously given by the
husband is still viable.
In Witback-Wildhagen. the Illinois court went on to hold the
-21-

husband not to be the legal father of the child because he did
not consent to the artificial insemination procedure.
Actual consent of Rick Krambule to the artificial
insemination procedure after his separation should be a factual
determination made by the trial court and not ruled as a matter
of law in a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Fundamental fairness

requires that Rick Krambule be given notice of Barbara Krambule's
continued efforts to become pregnant after the parties' separated
in order to make an informed decision; i.e., act voluntarily.

Ill
BARBARA KRAMBULE SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM ALLEGING RICK
KRAMBULE BE ADJUDICATED THE
FATHER PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINES
OF ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA

Mathew Krambule was born on March 24, 1992.

Barbara

Krambule did not file an action to seek support and enforce her
alleged contractual rights until July, 1996.

More than four (4)

years elapsed from filing her Petition after the parties' Divorce
Decree.

Barbara Krambule should be estopped from claiming Rick

Krambule is the father of the child.
A party alleging equitable estoppel bears the burden of
proving three (3) elements: representation, reliance, and
detriment.

Weise v. Weise. 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985);

Masters v. Worsley. 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App. 1989).
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Also, in State v. Irizarry. 893 P.2d 1107, 1109-1110 (Utah
App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held the Doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel has three (3) elements: (1) a statement,
admission, or failure to act by one (1) party inconsistent with a
later asserted claim; (2) the other parties' reasonable action or
inaction based upon the first parties' statement, admission, act,
or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate
its statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
In 1992, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed the
Stipulation which did not acknowledge Rick Krambule was the
father of Mathew Krambule.

Even though Barbara Krambule's

attorney in a letter dated December 3, 1991 stated she was going
to make an issue of the parentage of Mathew, she later signed the
Stipulation which did not address Mathew Krambule.

Also, Barbara

Krambule's attorney signed the Findings of Fact and Decree
approved as to form.
Rick Krambule reasonably relied upon Barbara Krambule's
statement, admission, act, or failure to make parentage of Mathew
an issue.

In reliance upon Barbara Krambule's inaction regarding

Mathew Krambule, Rick Krambule paid for Barbara Krambule's
college education and alimony.

Also, Rick Krambule intentionally

had no contact with Mathew Krambule in reliance upon Barbara
Krambule's conduct.
Equitable Estoppel is only invoked when the conduct and
circumstances would otherwise perpetrate a fraud or unfair
-23-

advantage.
1989).

Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah App.

Barbara Krambule by failing to advise Rick Krambule of

continued efforts to achieve a pregnancy after the parties'
separation, took an unfair advantage of Rick Krambule and she
should be equitably estopped from asserting Rick Krambule be
declared the legal father of Mathew.
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata not only prevent
litigation of a claim actually litigated in a previous hearing,
it also prevents the litigation of claims that could have or
should have been litigated in the prior action but were not.
Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App.
1994); Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)
Res Judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion.

Cooper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387,

389 (Utah App. 1987).

Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of

claims that have been fully litigated between the same parties,
and also precludes claims which could have and should have been
litigated in the prior action but were not raised.

Id. at 389.

In Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444-445 (Utah 1995), the
Utah Supreme Court held plaintiffs were barred in suing
defendants under a breach of contract theory as the breach of
contract theory claim could and should have been brought in the
fraud and negligence Complaint in their first lawsuit. Barbara
Krambule's parentage claim for Mathew against Rick Krambule
should be barred by the claims preclusion branch of res judicata.
See also Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350,
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1357 (Utah App. 1990).

IV
BARBARA KRAMBULE WAIVED ANY
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS GRANTED
UNDER THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
CONTRACT
Barbara Krambule claims the artificial insemination
agreement executed by the parties is a binding contract and Rick
Krambule has breached his contract with her.

The undisputed

facts in this case indicate Barbara Krambule continued with
artificial insemination procedures and became pregnant seven
weeks after separating from Rick Krambule.

Rick Krambule had no

knowledge Barbara Krambule was continuing with the artificial
insemination procedures.

Rick Krambule had no control over

Barbara Krambule's actions after the parties separated.

In this

case, Barbara Krambule and her then attorney signed the
Stipulation and her attorney signed the Findings and Decree of
Divorce approved as to form which did not address the issue of
Mathew Krambule. Barbara Krambule took no action regarding her
contractual rights for a period in excess of four (4) years.
Barbara Krambule has intentionally waived any contractual rights
she may have acquired under the artificial insemination
agreement.
In Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah
App. 1994), the Court of Appeals held waiver of a contractual
right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a
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manner inconsistent with its contractual rights, and as a result,
prejudice accrues to the opposing party to the contract.

Waiver

requires that there be an existing right, benefit, or advantage,
knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it.
B.R. Woodward Marketing. Inc. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101
(Utah App. 1988) .
In Findings of Fact No. 9. of Findings of Fact of Modification of Decree of Divorce the trial court found,
a.

During late October, 1991 after Barbara Krambule's

pregnancy with Mathew became known, Barbara Krambule told Rick
Krambule that she only wanted the Krambule name for Mathew and
nothing more from him;
b.

Barbara Krambule essentially made the same statement to

Rick Krambule's sister sometime later;
c. After Rick Krambule filed for divorce, Barbara Krambule
initially requested support for the expected child through her
then attorney, but later signed a Stipulation silent on the
matter of the child.

She further allowed Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce to issue without any
mention of Mathew though he was born at that time.
d.

During the divorce process, Barbara Krambule was very

emotional about the matter and spent some time in the hospital in
December, 1991 as a result.

Nevertheless, she testified that her

decision to make no claim for Mathew was carefully considered and
was made during the period of time she had the assistance of
counsel.
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e.

She filed her Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce

and for paternity as to Mathew on July 15, 1996, four years and
three months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Filing of

the Petition was precipitated by Rick Krambule's failure to
accept responsibility for Mathew following counseling by the
parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless
circumstance should be handled.
Such intentional conduct on the part of Barbara Krambule
amounts to waiver of a known existing contractual right.

The

trial court should have heard evidence adduced at a trial as to
whether there has been a waiver of contractual rights under the
artificial insemination agreement.
Under the doctrine of waiver the unexpressed, subjective
reasons for relinquishment of a right are largely irrelevant.
The question whether waiver will be found in any particular case
depends not upon the secret intention of the party against whom
it is asserted, but upon the effect which his conduct has had
upon the other party. Stated another way, one cannot prevent a
waiver by a private mental reservation contrary to an intent to
waive, where his or her actions clearly indicate such an intent.
B.R. Wood Marketing v. Collins Food. 754 P.2d 99, 103 (Utah App.
1988).

Barbara Krambule did not have the right to wait until she

was strong and healthy to proceed with her claim of support for
for Mathew. (4/30/98 TR. at 97). She was required to proceed
immediately and not wait for over four (4) years.
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CONCLUSION
The Modified Decree of Divorce entered July 8, 1998, should
be set aside inasmuch as the Court granted a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment ruling Rick Krambule to be the legal father of
Mathew Krambule as a matter of law.

There exists genuine

disputes over material facts in this case and granting summary
judgment was inappropriate.

The case should be remitted back to

the trial court for trial on the issues of whether Rick Krambule
is the father of Mathew Krambule pursuant to the artificial
insemination contract.

There exist genuine disputes of material

facts whether Rick Krambule acted voluntarily under the contract,
whether Barbara Krambule breached her duty of good faith and fair
dealing with the contract, whether Rick Krambule was entitled to
be notified of Barbara Krambule continued participation with
artificial insemination procedures, whether Barbara Krambule is
estopped or barred by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting
her claim against Rick Krambule, and whether Barbara Krambule has
waived contractual rights.
DATED this

^ ^ a y

of March, 1999.

+LJ£>

ROBERT L . NEEI
NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
A p p e l l a n t , R i c k D. Kafarabule
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT RICKY D.
KRAMBULE to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Appellee Barbara R.
Karmbule, Key Bank Building, Suite 200, 2491 Washington
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401.
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ADDENDUM INDEX
1. Deposition Exhibit No. 1 of Barbara Krambule's Deposition,
Contract to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through
Artificial Insemination
2. Deposition Exhibit No. 2 of Barbara Krambule's Deposition,
Attorney letter dated December 3, 1991
3. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion for Summary
Judgment
4.

Order on Motion for Summary Judgment

5. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Modified Decree of
Divorce
6.

Modified Decree of Divorce

7.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Decree of Divorce

8.

Decree of Divorce

9.

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
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Norton
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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
AND
DIVISION OF UROLOGY
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES1 TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN
1.
We f as husband and* wifef"acknowledge that we have been
unable to achieve a pregnancy because of one or more of the
following conditions* notwithstanding
thorough evaluation and
therapy:
(A)

Abnormality of the semenf including reduced
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm;

<B>

Cervical diseasei including immobilization
sperm!

(C)

Endometriosis;

t<

D)

(E)

of the

Other causes ^including* unexplained mfert I 11 ty;
Or have genetic problems.

2«
We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in ^n
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the" wif e/* wi th semen obtained from
an unidentified and undisclosed third Bartv donor<s>(A)

In order ^to facilitate the success
of this
procedurei **we ^wagreV r t o ^ f o 1 low procedures and
complete > ^dociimentVtfi'on
as
outlined
by the
Department of^ Obstetrics and/or the Division of
Urology of *^thV'* •Urnverslt9***of Utah School* of**
Medicine;

3, cWe 'are ^aware/on the* basVs* bf/preseht information, the*
fehancesrtKa't Tar pregnancy iw~i H^ibeHllac'hieved^by w -the ^artificials*
insemination -procedure(s ) thare "Jt^O-ySY* t h r o u g h
six cycles, and.**
acknowledge that* no >* rep^esenta>t 1'OTJ.S a *o IT guarantees, express^r^
implied, have been made^oto £,us iwi^bh ^fespect to whether-the,*,
procedures > will be successful*^
«j
*+*
We have been fuljy i^jj^orineji of^^all known significant
and substantial
risks <>incidentv to* ^ajyfc^f icial insemination?
whether fresh or frozen semen is used> which include:
1
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(A)

Bleeding and/or

infection;

<B>

Pain associated Kith the various procedures;

(C)

Discomfort
and
complictians
connected
pregnancy, childbirth ana delivery;

<D)

Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind*
including but not
limited
to
infection(s) or
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen;

<E)

Uncertainty of
genetic, hereditary
tendencies of such offspring;

(F)

Other adverse consequences of any kind, which are
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or
indirectly to the artificial
insemination and/or
procedureCs)-

traits

with

or

5.
We acknowledge that if pregnancy is achieved there is
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic
contribution from
the donor's sperm, and that in any event* all
pregnancies face a 3-V/» risk of some birth defect.
6.
Ule have been offered
the option of carrier
testing or
chromosome
testing of the donor
if there
is a history of
autosomal
recessive
trait
or
a
heritable
chromosomal
translocation in the wife.
7.
Ue have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions
about the procedureCs) and the risks involved* and our questions
have been fully answered to our satisfaction.
8.
We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial
insemination procedureCs) is voluntary.
9.
In order to artificially
inseminate the wife, the
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not
at any
time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the
success or failure of the insemination.
The undersigned, and
each of them, agree
that the identity of the donor shall not be
divulged
to them or
any
offspring
resulting
from such
insemination
for any reason by the doctor, except upon the
issuance of a duly authorized order of court of competent
jurisdiction, the
issuance of which shall
not be sought by the
undersigned.
The doctor shall require
the donor
to agree in
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned.

a
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10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept
the full legal* moral, parentali financial, social, emotional and
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result
from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination
procedure(s).
We also mutually and individually agree to accept
and assume
the same duties* obligations and responsibilities
toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as
owed by the undersigned
to naturally
occurring offspring, and
acknowledge and agree that any offspring
resulting from the
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s)
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child
of the husband And wife, and the husband
shall for all purposes
be considered the father of the said offspring.
11. The doctor
in consultation with husband and wife may
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors,
to select
the donor(s), including
the laboratory which has
collected, processed and stored the semen, It is understood that
risk factors set forth in paragraph M A ) , <C), & (D) ar& greater
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks.
IE. We hereby covenant and agree, without
reservation of
right, in law or equity, to indemnifyf hold harmless and release
the doctor, the persons who are
the donors of the semen, those
persons who collect, store, and/or preserve and manipulate the
semen specimens, the University of Utan, the university of Utah
Hospital, the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology*
the
Division of Urology, their officers* employees and agents from
any and all liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever, in
any manner connected with or related to:
(A)

Complications of pregnancy;

(B)

Complications in any manner
birth and/or delivery;

(C)

Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any
birth defecti or of abnormalities of any kind,
including but
not limited
to infections or
transmitted diseased throuqh donor semen;

(D)

Genetic, hereditary
offspring;

(E)

Any other adverse consequences of any kind that
may arise or be connected directly or indirectly
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from
the artificial
insemination and/or procedure(s)
herein authorized or contemplated.

traits or

connected with child

tendencies of such

13. We agree, individually and severally, that neither of
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in
3
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any child
or offspring
in
legal proceeding with respect
resulting from the artificial
herein.

14-. -" We agree
and acknowledge
that
the procedures (s)
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical
services.
15.
W i t h t h e a b o v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in m i n d * w e , i n d i v i d u a l l y
a n d a s h u s b a n d a n d w i f e , h e r e b y c o n s e n t to> r e q u e s t and a u t h o r i z e
Dr.
V N; c < "A
t who
is herein referred
to as "our
doctor,"
and such assistants and associates as our doctor may
designate,
no undertake one or more artificial insemination
procedures
in an attempt
to achieve pregnancy
in the wife,
understanding and accepting all
the risks and responsibilities
attendant thereto.
16.
Confident iali tv.
We understand
that our doctor, the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology
and the University of Utah, will
consider
the information
developed about us during this treatment
as confidential, and
that neither
our identity nor specific
medical details will be
revealed by any
of them without our prior consent, however,
specific
medical
details may
be revealed
in professional
publications, but our
identify
is not
to be revealedWe
understand
that
in
the
event an authorized government
agency
reviews this or other documents) they may learn of our identity.
17.
Procedures Authorized to Treat Unforeseen Conditions,
We recognize
that during
the course of any of the procedures
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event
we authorise and request our doctor, his assistants or his
designees! to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of
professional judgment necessary and desirable.
18.
We acknowledge that
the University of
Utah, the
University
of
Utah School of Medicine, the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urologyi and all
officers and employees, including our doctor, are subject to the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Section 63-30.1,
et sea., U-C.A.
1953 as amended> which Act controls all
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability.
19.
Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs.
Agreement shall be binding upon our administ

4

This Consent
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20.
Signatures.
We acknowledge by our signatures below
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction.
UNDERSIGNED:
ui i f g i t^-vv .z&^rsjr n -Yyc^Ar-„

Date:

ft-1

I 9: - ^,;V^ - <"•< C >
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J
Husband: ~ U —
'Date:
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WITNESS:
SIGNATURE
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Date:
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Vlahos} Sharp & Wight
PETE N VLAHOS
H DON SHARP
GERALO S WIGHT
JOHN W BRADLEY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
LEGAL FORUM BUILOING
OGDEN. UTAH 8440J

PHONE (801) 621-2464
FAX (801) 621-6218

244 7 KlESEL AVENUE

December 3, 1991

Attorney Robert L, Neeley
2485 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule
My File No- 400-11909-V
Dear Robert:
In connection with the above matter, my client has
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it.
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insemination so that the parties could have another child.
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a
child.
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and
shefs going to obtain for me his written consent, the
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court
has acknowledged these types of agreements.
My client has indicated that if he will not put up
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up
any claim she has to alimony.
In addition, she indicated that she would allow
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer
vacation.
Please review this with your client, get back with me
\2 DEPOSITION
1
EXHIBIT

®

Attorney Robe - L. Neeley
Re: Krambule \ . Krambule
Page 2

and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let
me know.
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that
and my client is not willing to sign it.
I did forward to her a copy, she has it, and that's
what brought this to mind because she does not feel that
this child should be left out and the parties would then
have two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns
out to be, whether it's a boy or a girl.
Please review this with your client and get back with
me and if we can resolve it great and if not, then let's
get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet and
if your client is not willing to negotiate this item then
one or both of us should file a request for Pre-trial.
I will await your response. I remain,

PNV:kh
cc: Barbara Krambule

<a
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge: Darwin Hanson

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial

LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

determinations that have been raised by the parties in their pleadings.

n
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2.

The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment

and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child
in question.
3.

The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child.

4.

In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means.

Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception.
5.

The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract

entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents.
6.

The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into

of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have
assume the full rights as natural parents.
7.

The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event

must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom
ROBERT ECHARD

prior to the divorce being granted. Consequently, the contract was not terminated.

& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

/

/n

A

C^

8.

The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a

minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to
repudiate the contract in this case.
9.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child,

Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992.
10.

The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the

natural parent of Matthew.
11.

The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for

artificial insemination.
2.

The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this

case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child.
3.

The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce

4.

The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the

of the parties.

legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child.
5.
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
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The court rules that the Plaintiff has the same legal responsibilities and rights

of a natural parent in regards to Matthew, born on March 24, 1992.

6.

The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an

evidentiary trial.
DATED this

of March, 1998.

DARWIN HANSON
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.

DATED thisxCday of March, 1998.

t>c*o^
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden,UT 84401
DATED this £ ^ d a y of March, 1998.

LEGAL ASSISTANT

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge: "XX,0;W ^ -

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

2.

The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24,1992.
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3.

The remaining evidentiary issues shall be determined at a trial to be set by

the court.

r& \

DATED t h i^s ^ T d a y of March, 1998.

District Court Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.

DATED this^i. day of March, 1998.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden, UT 84401
lis
DATED this

ay of March, 1998.

-—~"LEGAL ASSISTANT

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

^ ' ^

O,")^

Tab 5

L^io^Dirsfc:-^.
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Respondent
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge:

The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of
the legal memorandum, now therefore the court makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

1.

The parties were married on the 31 st day of March, 1979.

LAW OFFICES
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2.

Two (2) children were conceived by artificial insemination and born during the

course of the marriage, namely:

STEPHANIE KRAMBULE, born on January 29, 1985 and

MATTHEW WADE KRAMBULE, born on March 24, 1992.
3.

A Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court on the 3rd day of

April, 1992.
4.

At the time of the Divorce, the Petitioner monthly income was $3,250.00 and

the Respondent's monthly income was $2,042.00.
5.

The present annual income of the parties is as follows:

Petitioner:
a.

Wages - Alpine Paving Mgnmt.

$75,000.00

b.

Alpine Paving and Const.

$37,317.00

c.

Rent

$18,613.00
TOTAL

$130,930.00

Therefore, Petitioner's current monthly income is $10,911.00.
The court does not credit line 7 of the Respondent's Exhibit 7 as income for child
support because it is the finding of the court that the sum of $44,132.00 is necessary retained
earnings of the company to operate the business during the coming accounting year of the business.
Under Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) UCA, monies for business expenses are not considered income for
child support purposes.
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES

Respondent:
a.

Wages - Hill Air Force Base

$42,452.00

KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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Therefore, Respondent's current monthly income is $3,538.00.
6.

The Decree of Divorce is silent concerning Matthew, but provides the following

for Stephanie:
a.

Paragraph 2 gives custody of Stephanie to the Respondent;

b.

Paragraph 3 gives Petitioner standard visitation;

c.

Paragraph 5 awards Respondent $326.00 per month for child support;

d.

Paragraph 7 requires each to pay one-half of the daycare expenses for

Stephanie.
7.

The Petitioner is current with the payment of child support for Stephanie

through August, 1997, at which time she began living with Petitioner. The court makes no finding
or order from that date forward in that Petitioner has a Petition for Change of Custody as to
Stephanie which is presently pending.
8.

The Petitioner previously disclaimed paternity and therefore denied any legal

responsibility for Matthew in that Respondent conceived after the parties separated. This court has
heretofore ruled pursuant to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement that given the
factual predicate of this case, Petitioner is the legal father of Matthew and therefore has the legal
duties of a biological father. Petitioner, however, alleges that Respondent should be estopped from
now claiming past legal benefits for Matthew in that she engaged in conduct at the time of the
divorce which reasonably induced Petitioner to rely thereon to his detriment.
ROBERT ECHARD

9.

The Court finds the following with respect to Petitioner's Estoppel argument:

& ASSOCIATES
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a.

During late October, 1991, after Respondent's pregnancy with Matthew

became known, Respondent told Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Matthew
and nothing more from him;
b.

She essentially made the same statement to Petitioner's sister sometime

c.

After Petitioner filed fro divorce, she initially requested support for the

later.

expectant child through her then attorney, but later signed a stipulation silent on the matter of the
child. She further allowed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce to issue
without any mention of Matthew though he was born at the time.
d.

During the divorce process, Respondent was very emotional about the

matter and spent some time in the hospital in December, 1991 as a result. Nevertheless, she
testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully considered and was made
during the period she had the assistance of counsel.
e.

She filed her petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and for Paternity

as to Matthew on July 15,1996,4 years and 3 months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The
filing of the Petition was precipitated by Petitioner's failure to accept responsibility for Matthew
following counseling by the parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless
circumstance should be handled.
10.
ROBERT ECHARD

In return for Respondent's failure to act, or to make claim against Petitioner for

legal benefits concerning Matthew, he agreed to pay Respondent alimony, provide for her

& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
IEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I
491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

-A^

education at Weber State University in Ogden, Utah, and preceded to live his life without
consideration as to any financial obligation for Matthew.
11.

Respondent has incurred the following medical debts for herself and Matthew

from the time of her conception with Matthew until the filing of her Petition to Modify the Decree
of Divorce:
Nature of Debt

Year

Amount

Medical
Pharmaceutical
Medical

1991
1991
1992

$1,996.95
$ 151.52
$5,872.32

TOTAL
12.

$8,020.79

Respondent has incurred the following child care expenses for Stephanie and

Matthew since the entry of the Decree of Divorce:

13,

Child

Year

Amount

Stephanie
Stephanie
Stephanie & Matthew
Stephanie
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew

1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

$ 770.00
$ 361.00
$1,627.25
$ 835.70
$1,927.35
$2,860.00
$2,339.00
$ 956.00
$1,106.00

Respondent's reasonable monthly needs for her and both children are as

follows:
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
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Item (family expenses^)

Amount

Mortgage on home
Maintenance on home

$ 806.00
$ 27.00

^

Utilities
Phone
Transportation (gas & oil for car)
Food
Misc.
TOTAL

$
$
$
$
$

141.00
45.00
150.00
300.00
300.00

$1,769.00

Item (children expenses)

Amount

Clothing
School Expenses
School Lunches
Co-Pay Medical
Co-Pay Dental
Health Insurance
Misc.

$ 75.00
$ 100.00
$ 80.00
$ 50.00
$ 10.00
$ 36.00
$ 300.00

TOTAL

$ 651.00

Each child's need is therefore equal to 1/3 of the family expenses plus Vi of the children's expenses
or $915.00.
14.

Respondent has incurred attorney's fees regarding her Petition for Modification

and for Paternity as follows:
Nature of Charge

Rate

Amount

Attorney fees

$150/hr.

$5,803.13

The total amount does not include fees associated with Petitioner's pending Modification of Decree
of Divorce concerning a change of custody of Stephanie. Moreover, it appears that the approximate
number of hours expended is 39 which the court finds reasonable given the nature of the issues
ROBERT ECHARD

raised in the proceeding. The court further finds the hourly rate to be reasonable.

& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
<EY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

V 4J

15.

The court also finds that Respondent is in need of assistance in paying the

attorney's fees. She has been using her credit card to make ends meet. She has received no
assistance from Petitioner for her medical care or for Stephanie's child care heretofore itemized
above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the

Decree of Divorce.
2.

Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and

control of Matthew with Petitioner having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory
guidelines.
3.

The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic

Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in
determining what a reasonable child support should be. Based on Finding No. 12(?) above, a
reasonable child support should be the percentage of the parties income to the combined total
multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is $10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals
$14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that total. Therefore, Petitioner should pay to
Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child.
Therefore, Respondent should be awarded child support from the Petitioner for both children in
the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of August, 1996, which is the
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
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month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for Modification.

4.

The Court concludes that the child support should be retroactive to the date

stated above for the following reasons:
a.

Stephanie:

Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for

Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks having the initial's B.Q.F.O. written
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F

Off." The initials started

appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution.
b.

Matthew:

The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible

for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable. In this matter, the Court finds
that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is
sufficient to disallow payment for back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.
5.

Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent should be awarded judgment against

Petitioner for back child support as follows:
a.
ROBERT ECHARD
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Stephanie:

The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month

for 13 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living
with her father) less $326.00 per month for the 13 month period for child support that was paid.

The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification.
b.

Matthew:

The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for

20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore,
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00
6.

Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for

the children according to the applicable statutory provisions.
7.

Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for past due child

care pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows:
a.

Stephanie:

The past due child care is calculated as follows:

Year

Amount

1992

$135.00

$361 divided by 2 multiplied
by 0.75 (April through Dec.)
$1627 divided by 4
1993 $835.70 divided by 2
Total
b.

Matthew:

$407.00
$418.00
$960.00

The past due child care is only applicable from August,

1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows:
Year

Amount

1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months
of the year) divided by 2
1997 $1,106 divided by 2

$201.00
$553.00

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

Total

$754.00
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8.

The Court concludes that Respondent should keep medical insurance on the

children in accordance with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs
not covered by the policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are
not applicable as to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was
insufficient to break out those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable
to the pregnancy and birth of Matthew.
9.

Petitioner should be awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and

Respondent should be awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return. At such time as
Stephanie is no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties should alternate Matthew
as an exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible.
Petitioner's right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his
being current with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year.
10.

Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees

in the sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by
Respondent.
DATED t h i s ' y

day of-Mayf 1998.

D A ^ W I ^ e . HAI
DistncTCourt Judge

4M^^

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
CEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I
1491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

10

X

,.c.

Tab 6

I^VTON DISTRICT O J i p T

JUL

9

LJ l c

[ j >^

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Respondent
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Petitioner,

MODIFIED DECREE OF
DIVORCE

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge:

The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of
the legal memorandum, now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Respondent is awarded the care, custody and control of Matthew with Petitioner

ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES

having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory guidelines.

LAW OFFICES
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801)393.2300
FAX (801) 393-2340

2.

The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic

Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in

\t

• o

determining what a reasonable child support should be. Child support shall be the percentage of
the parties income to the combined total multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is
$10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals $14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that <
total. Therefore, Petitioner shall pay to Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support.
75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child. The Respondent is awarded child support from the
Petitioner for both children in the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of
August, 1996, which is the month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for
Modification.
3- .

The child support shall be retroactive to the date stated above for the following

reasons:
a.

Stephanie:

Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for

Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks having the initial's B.Q.F.O. written
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F

Off." The initials started

appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution.
b.

Matthew:

The Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible

for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES

prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable. In this matter, the Court finds

vEY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I
1491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN, UTAH S4401
(801)393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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Total
b.

Matthew:

$960.00

The past due child care is only applicable from August,

1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows:
Year
1996
1997

Amount
$969 times 0.42 (5 months
of the year) divided by 2
$1,106 divided by 2
Total

7.

$201.00
$553.00
$754.00

The Respondent shall keep medical insurance on the children in accordance

with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs not covered by the
policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are not applicable as
to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was insufficient to break out
those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable to the pregnancy and
birth of Matthew.
8.

Petitioner is awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and

Respondent is awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return. At such time as Stephanie is
no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties shall alternate Matthew as an
exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. Petitioner's
right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his being current
with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year.
ROBERT ECHARD
& ASSOCIATES
LAW OFFICES
XY BANK BUILDING, SUITE 200 I
491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD |
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 393-2300
FAX (801) 393-2340
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9.

Respondent is awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees in the

sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by
Respondent.
DATED this
lis /

day oWfrf, 1998.

_
C. HANSEN
District Court Judge

^4m^
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D. KRAMBULE
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE
Defendant.
TAPE:
DIGIT:
TAPE:
DIGIT:

February 10, 1992
:

9107 50473 DA

1128
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN
3666-3877
Lisa Adams, Clerk
1129
M. Benson, Bailiff
1-84
This is the time set for hearing on a default
divorce. The plaintiff is present and represented by Robert L.
Neeley..
The plaintiff is sworn and testifies. The parties
have irreconcilable differences. There has been one minor
child born as issue of the marriage. The defendant is awarded
the care, custody and control of the minor child. There is a
child expected by the defendant but the child is not the
plaintiff's.
The plaintiff is awarded the business Alpine Paving &
Construction.
The court finds that it has jursidiction over the
parties and the subject matter. The parties have previously
entered into a written stipulation which appears to the court
to be fair and equitable and it is to be incorporated into the
decree. The plaintiff has proven his allegations in his
complaint relating to the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. The court will award the Decree of Divorce to
become final upon entry. Mr. Robert L. Neeley is to prepare
the final order.

ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave., Suite
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-3646

APR G 1 2 1 7 PM'32
BY _ .1/3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

]

Plaintiff,

]1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

]

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,

])

Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

)

Civil No. 910750473

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 10th

day

of February,

1992, before Domestic

Relations

Commissioner, Michael G. Allphin; plaintiff was personally present
and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Neeley; defendant was
not personally present nor represented by counsel, Pete N. Vlahos,
however, the parties having executed a Stipulation and Property
Settlement

Agreement;

and

plaintiff

having

been

sworn

and

testified, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, State of
Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately prior to
commencement of this action.
2.

That plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife,

FINDINGS OF FACT
KRAMBILE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 91075473

having been married on or about the 31st day of March, 1979, in
Ogden, Weber County, Utah.
3.

That

one

child has been

born as

issue

to

this

marriage, to-wit: Stephanie Krambule, date of birth January 29,
1985.
custody

That defendant is a fit and proper person to have the care,
and

control

of

said

child,

subject

to

plaintiff's

reasonable and standard rights of visitation.
4.

That the parties have irreconcilable differences for

which the marriage relationship should be terminated.
5.

That the parties sold their home situated at 703 W.

650 N., Clearfield, Davis County, Utah; have acquired various items
of personal property, including a 1987 Jeep Cherokee motor vehicle,
a

savings

and

retirement

at

furnishings,

checking

account,

an

Hill

Air

Force

fishing

boat

together

equipment, an ownership interest

IRA

Base,
with

account,

defendant's

household

furniture,

trailer

and

camping

in Alpine Paving Company,

and

personal effects during the course of the marriage.
6.

The parties have no debts or obligations except for

the mortgage on the home located at 703 W. 650 N., Clearfield,
Utah.
7.

That defendant

is gainfully employed

at Hill Air

Force Base earning $2,042.00 per month, and plaintiff is presently
employed at Alpine Paving & Construction Company earning $3,250.00

FINDINGS OF FACT
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750472

per month.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That each party shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce
from the other to become final upon entry.
2.

That the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement

approved by the Court shall be incorporated in the Decree of
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-3646
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,

)

Judge: Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

)

Civil No. 910750473

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on the 10th day of February, 1992, before Domestic Relations
Commissioner, Michael G. Allphin; plaintiff was personally present
and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Neeley; defendant was
not personally present nor represented by counsel, Pete N. Vlahos,
however, the parties having executed a Stipulation and Property
Settlement

Agreement;

and

plaintiff

having

been

sworn

and

testified, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and
having made and signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That each party is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce
from the other to become final upon entry.
2.

That defend ant is hereby awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties1 minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date
of birth January 29, 1985.

V

^
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DECREE OF DIVORCE
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473
Page 2

3.

That plaintiff

is hereby

granted

the

standard

visitation rights as utilized by the Second Judicial District
Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the
time stated above.
4.

That defendant is hereby ordered to maintain the

parties1 minor child on her health and accident insurance with Hill
Air Force Base.

Each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half the

non-covered medical and dental expenses incurred for benefit of the
parties'
Provisions

minor

child

adopted

and

by the

incorporate

The

above-entitled

Standard

Court

Medical

herein.

The

Standard Medical Provisions is attached hereto and by reference
made a part of this Decree.

In the event defendant does not have

available to her at her place of employment a medical and health
plan, plaintiff shall obtain a medical and health plan for benefit
of the parties' minor child through his employment.
5. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant
the sum of $326.00 per month as and for child support based upon
his gross annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year from Alpine Paving
& Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of

010216;
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$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base.
6. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant
the sum of $274.00 per month

as and for alimony for a period not

to exceed four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates
from Weber State University

whichever event comes first; also,

alimony shall terminate by operation of law, i.e. cohabitation or
remarriage.
7.

That plaintiff

is hereby ordered to pay one-half

(1/2) of the day care expense incurred for benefit of the parties'
minor child care expense.
8.

Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant

may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is
pursuing

a

bachelor's

degree.

Defendant

is

approximately

a

sophomore in college and plaintiff's obligation to pay for her
books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1,
1991.
9. That the family home and real property located at 703
W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah
received one-half

has been

sold and

each party

has

the net sales proceeds, and if there are any

additional payments received for payment of the reserve account,
each party shall also divide the same equally.
10.

That

defendant

is hereby

awarded the

1987

Jeep

Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and

01QS16-?
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one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home.
11.

That defendant is hereby awarded his IRA, his

retirement, his interest

in Alpine Paving, Inc., his camping

equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net
sale proceeds from the sale of the home.
12.

The parties shall divide equally the joint account

at Shearson Leheman.
13.

That defendant shall be paid $7,825.0 on or before

January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc.
14.

That

the

parties

have

equitably

divided

the

household furniture and furnishings and personal effects, and
neither party makes any claim upon the other for any item of
personal property.
15. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain a life
insurance policy in the sum of $50,000.0 and defendant is hereby
ordered to maintain a life insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and
each party shall designate their minor child, Stephanie Krambule,
as beneficiary thereto and each party shall maintain said child as
beneficiary until she reaches at least 18 years of age.
16. That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties'
minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of
computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current

OiO.216'1

DECREE OF DIVORCE
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on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may
incur by reason of not being allowed to claim said child as a
dependent for tax purposes.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay

defendant in cash for any loss she may incur prior to defendant
signing any forms necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties'
child as a dependent

for tax purposes. Defendant

to furnish

plaintiff all necessary tax information no later than February 28
of each year and plaintiff to advise defendant no later than March
30 of each year as to his election whether to claim the parties1
child as a dependent for tax purposes.
17.

That each party shall pay their own attorney fees

and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings.
218.

That each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half

of any non-covered medical expense incurred during the course of
the marriage and each party is hereby ordered to pay any debts and
obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation
on or about May 3, 1991.
19.

That plaintiff is hereby

ordered to be solely

responsible for all business debts incurred in connection with
Alpine Paving, Inc. and shall hold defendant harmless thereon.
20.

In the event defendant decides to move from the

immediate area, she shall

notify plaintiff

of her intent to

relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of

0102165
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forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving.
DATED this

p

day of Aoril,

1992.

riCHAEL G/ ALLPHIN
Domestic Relations
Commissioner
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PETE N.' VLAHQS
Attorney for Defendant

0102166'

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS

[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to
provide other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls.
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and
procedures for any ana all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschological counseling, for which he
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the p n m a e facie obligation to pay any non insurance
covered expense.
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the
court. The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs ana attorney fees.
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay
and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then
each party will normally be ordered to Day one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or
procedures.
*hen the other parent is expected to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to
•nedical or aental expenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide
copies of ail receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing
therefore incurrea. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be
p n m a e facie aeemea waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion ot those payments, or
-naxe arrangements to ao so within 45 days of receipt O T the aocumentat 1 on supporting required
participation.
The party wno nas the nealth ana accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit
CT the family until such time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage
available to the soouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

rUs^MjL

LLu&*£

Commissioner, Weber)

County District Court
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced)
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-3 64 6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff ,
vs.

]

BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,

)
y

Defendant.

Judge:

» civil NO.

iicn&iyj

WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and
WHEREAS,
agreeing

the parties

are desirous

at this time with respect

of

stipulating

and

to the issues raised by said

action, NOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY

STIPULATED AND AGREED

by and between the

parties hereto as follows, to-wit:
1.

That

plaintiff

may have

his hearing

to obtain

a

mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation
and Agreement.
2.

That

defendant

is awarded

the care,

custody

and

control of the parties' minor child, Stephanie Krambule, date of
birth January 29, 1985.

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

3.
visitation

That

rights

plaintiff

as utilized

shall
by

be

granetd

the Second

the

standard

Judicial

District

Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the
time stated above.
4.

That defendant shall maintain the parties1 minor

child on her health and accident
Base.

insurance with Hill Air Force

Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and

dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child
and

incorporate The Standard Medical Provisions adopted

above-entitled Court herein.

by the

The Standard Medical Provisions is

attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation.
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child
through his employment.
5.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving &
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base.
6.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony
shall

terminate

by

operation

of

law,

i.e.

cohabitation

or

remarr iage.
7.

That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the

day

care expense incurred for benefit of the parties1 minor child

and

defendant shall provide written

documentation of the monthly child

care expense.
8.

Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant

may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is
pursuing
sophomore

a

bachelor's

degree.

Defendant

is

approximately

in college and plaintiff's obligation

a

to pay for her

books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1,
1991.
9.

That the family home and real property located at 703

W. 650 N., Clearfield, Utah
received

has been

sold and

one-half the net sales proceeds, and

each party

has

if there are any

additional payments received for payment of the reserve account,
each party shall also divide the same equally.
10.

That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep

^\

STIPULATION
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Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home.
11.
retirement,

That

his

defendant

interest

shall

in Alpine

be

awarded

Paving,

his

Inc., his

IRA,

his

camping

equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net
sale proceeds from the sale of the home.
12.

The parties shall divide equally the joint account

at Shearson Leheman.
13.

That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before

January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc.
14.
household
neither

That

furniture

the
and

parties

have

furnishings

party makes any claim

upon

and

equitably
personal

the other

for

divided

the

effects, and
any

item of

personal property.
15.

That

plaintiff

shall maintain

a life

insurance

policy in the sum of $50,000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at
least 18 years of age.
16.

That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties'

minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of

Oh

STIPULATION
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computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may
incur by reason of not being allowed
dependent for tax purposes.

to claim said child as a

Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash

for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties' child as a dependent
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax
information no later than February 28 of each year and plaintiff to
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his
election whether to claim the parties1 child as a dependent for tax
purposes.
17.

That each party shall pay their own attorney fees

and cost of Court incurred in these proceedings.
18.

That each party

shall pay one-half

of any non-

covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage
and

each

party

shall

be

responsible

to

pay

any

debts

and

obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation
on or about May 3, 1991.
19.

That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all

business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and
shall hold defendant harmless thereon.
20.

In the event defendant decides to move from the

immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to

STIPULATION
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relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving.

DATED this

/£

day of *"U^'^C

, 1992..

/-

^

R ICKY D. KRAMBULE
Plaintiff

TOBERT L. NEETTEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

LA

rp-hv^cwYJC
BARBARA R. KRAtfTBULE
Defendant

N.

VI/AH<

Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE SECC

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

F DAVIS COUNTY

COMMISSIONER'S VISITATION GUIDELINES
Reasonable visitation should be defined as the parents may
agree. If they are not able to agree, reasonable/standard visitation
will routinely be defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten)
children as follows:
1. Alternate weekends;
Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m.
2.

Midweek:

Alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

3.

Holidays:
(A) CHRISTMAS - non-custodial parent to have
Christmas Day beginning at 1 p.m. and continuing through one-half
of the child's total Christmas school vacation.
(B) THANKSGIVING & EASTER - non-custodial parent
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1992, 94, 96, etc.);
Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.
Non-custodial parent to have Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 9r;
etc.); Easter holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.
(C) OTHER HOLIDAYS - New Year's Day, Martin Luther
King Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, and
Labor Day. These holidays are to be alternated, with the
non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday.
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and
no changes should be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend schedule.

4.

Father's Day/Mother's Day:
As appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6 p.m.
the day of.

5.

Birthdays;
One evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the week
of the child's birthday and the non-custodial parent's birthday.

6.

Extended Visitation:
(A) SUMMER - Four weeks continuous, with written notice of
dates provided to custodial parent by May First. Custodial
parent to have alternate weekends, holiday, and phone
visitation.
(B) YEAR-ROUND SCHOOL - Two two-week periods, with wr.i i •
notice of dates to custodial parent at least 30 days prio
visitation. Custodial parent to have holiday, and phone
visitation during this time.
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year
uninterrupted time with the children for purposes of vacation,
provided the same does not interfere with holiday visitation
per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing oi
such two-week period at least 30 days in advance.

7.

Telephone: - Reasonable visitation before 8 p.m.

8.

Other times as agreed by the parties.

i£?

IN THE SECOND JUOICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD MEDICAL PROVISIONS

[Plaintiff] [Defendant] [is] [are] ordered to provide health, accident and dental insurance for
the benefit of the parties' minor children, with deductible amounts and coverage equal to those in
existence as of the date of this order for so long as coverage is available through insured's current
or subsequent place of employment (Plaintiff's - Defendant's) is to be primary insurance. Each parent
is ordered to pay for one-half of any deductible or non covered amounts for such essential medical or
dental services or prescriptions related thereto that are not paid by the insurance coverage and to
provide
other parent with executed claim forms and other assistance necessary to insure the prompt
payment of the insured portion of such claims and notify other party of insurance claims as paid. The
custodial parent is to pay routine office calls.
Neither parent shall contract for or incur any obligation for orthodontia work or elective
surgery for the child, or any type of psychological counseling or evaluation for a child, anticipating
co-payment from other parent without the prior agreement or consent of that parent in writing. The
non-custodial parent will have the right in advance to have a say in the selection of doctors and
procedures for any ana all orthodontia, or surgery procedures, or pschologicat counseling, for which he
or she is expected to contribute. If such debts are incurred without said consultation, and written
consent, then the obligating parent shall have the primae facie obligation to pay any non insurance
covered expense.
If an agreement cannot be reached, then before any (other than emergency), medical, orthodontic
or pschological counseling be done as a co-obligation, the matter shall be brought back before the
court.

The party found to be unreasonably causing the hearing shall pay costs and attorney fees.
For procedures not covered by the insurance but reasonably within the parties ability to pay

and necessary to the welfare of the child, such as orthodontia cosmetic surgery, or mental medical then
each party will normally be ordered to oay one-half of the costs associated with such treatments or
procedures.
when the other parent is exDectea to be responsible for deductible amounts attributable to
medical or dental exoenses incurred for the parties' children, then the incurring parent must provide
copies of all receipts associated with those expenses within 30 days of the receipt of any billing
there-tore incurred. Any claims not maae to the other parent within that time frame in writing will be
primae facie deemed waived. The other party is ordered to make their portion of those payments, or
rnaxe arrangements to oo so within <*5 days of receipt of the documentation supporting required
parti cioat1 on.
The party who nas the health ana accident insurance is ordered to maintain it for the benefit
of the family until sucn time as the Decree in this matter is final and to make continued coverage
available to the soouse under "COBRA"; provided however the spouse taking advantage of said coverage
shall pay the cost thereof unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
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Commissioner, Weber)
County District Court
(When applicable the standard should be typed into your findings and decree or a typed
insertion of it shall be attached to the order or decree; not merely referenced)
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COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KRAMBULE
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS!
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY

vs.
Civil No.
BARBARA R.

910750473

KRAMBULE

1. Enter the combined number of natural and adopted children of this mother
and father.
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income.
Refer to Instructions for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). *
2 c Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations
ordered for the children in this case).
2 d Optional: Enter the amountfromLine 12 of the Children in Present Home
Worksheet for either parent,
Subtract Line 2b, 2c, and 2dfrom2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly
Gross for child support purposes.
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of
the Base Support Obligation.
Enter the children's portion of monthly medical and dental insurance
preminms paid to insurance company.
8, Enter the monthly work or training related child cart expense for the
the children in Line 1.
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor parent.
10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award
Subtract the Obligor's Line 7fromLine 9.
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child
Divide Line 10 by Line I.
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11 CHILD CARE AWARD
Muiuply Line 8 by JO to obtain obligors share of child care expense. Add to Line 10 only
when expense is actually incurred.
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